In this paper, we investigate the consequences of the rise in educational attainment on the US generational accounts. We build on the 1995 accounts of Gokhale et al. (1999) and disaggregate them per schooling level. We show that low skill newborns are characterized by a negative generational account (-15.4% of their lifetime labor income) whilst medium and high skill newborns have positive accounts (26.8 and 32.3% of their lifetime labor income). Compared to Gokhale et al., our baseline forecast is more optimistic. Nevertheless, the rise in educational attainment is not strong enough to restore the generational balance. The current fiscal policy generates a long run deficit. Balancing the budget requires increasing taxes (by about 1.2%) or reducing transfers (by about 2.7%). These results are robust to growth and discounting assumptions, to the treatment of education spending. They are sensitive to assumptions about the schooling level of future generations.
Introduction
Since the seminal works of Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotliko¤ (1991, 1994) , and Kotliko¤ (1992) , generational accounting has usually been perceived as a meaningful way to evaluate the sustainability of …scal policy. It builds on an original treatment of the government's intertemporal budget constraint: at any date, the present value of government purchases must be covered by the current net public wealth, the present value of net taxes which will be paid by living generations over the rest of their lifetime and the present value of net taxes which will be paid by future generations over their whole lifetime. The basic questions are: what burden must the government leave on future generations to remain solvent? Is the resulting …scal treatment of future generations' members identical to that of the current newborns?
Economically, there is no reason for equalizing individual taxes and transfers.
Most …scal regimes involve high taxes for high income individuals and low taxes for less productive workers. The same rationale can be applied to intergenerational redistribution. If one generation is economically more productive than another (for example because its proportion of rich agents is higher), it seems justi…ed to make it pay more taxes or receive less transfers. The generational accounting methodology partially takes account of di¤erences in generational wealth by comparing generations in terms of …scal pressure rather than on gross burden. Using balanced growth assumptions, the classical methodology de…nes the generationally balanced policy as a situation in which individual taxes and transfers increase at the same pace as labor 3 productivity. However, existing generational accounting exercises rely on very simple assumptions about the changes in labor productivity and/or lifetime labor income across generations. Usually, these changes are related to a path of exogenous growth rates that have no explicit link with the skill composition of the generations. Hence, existing studies do not take account of an important source of heterogeneity within and between generations, i.e. the rise in educational attainment of successive cohorts.
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the US accounts of Gokhale, Page and Sturrock (1999) 1 by introducing skill heterogeneity in the generational accounting
technique.
2 GPS demonstrate that the US …scal policy is unsustainable and generationally imbalanced. They evaluate the …scal pressure imposed on a generation by its lifetime net tax rate, i.e. the ratio of the present value (at birth) of net taxes one generation has to pay to the government over its lifetime on the present value of its lifetime labor income. They show that the lifetime net tax rate of future generations amounts to 49.2%, to be compared with 28.6% for the current newborns. Such a framework with a single representative agent within each generation fails to capture the evolution of skills. In this paper, we demonstrate that it is crucial to introduce skill heterogeneity for three main reasons:
1 Henceforth GPS. 2 It should be noted that heterogeneity has already been introduced in the generational accounting framework. Most existing works distinguish males and females. This can be important for illustrative purpose but has a smaller incidence on long-run evaluations since the sex composition of living and future cohorts is extremely stable over time. Other studies such as Auerbach and Oreopoulos (2000) on the US, Bonin and al. (1999) on Germany or Collado and al. (2001) on Spain distinguish between natives and immigrants so as to evaluate the …scal e¤ect of immigration policies. This is obviously pertinent in countries where migrants represent a large share of the population and/or where selective immigration policies are explicit.
² …rstly, it concerns the US population as a whole; ² secondly, the age-pro…le of taxes and transfers is highly dependent on educational attainment. We distinguish three large categories of education: less than high school (<HS), high school (HS) and more than high school (>HS). According to our estimations, the average lifetime income of a low skill individual amounts to $81,373 to be compared to $174,293 for a medium skill worker and $311,540 for a high skill worker. On the contrary, the present value of public bene…ts received by an agent over her whole lifetime amounts to $58,063 for the low skilled, $30,974 for the medium skilled and $21,373 for the high skilled;
² …nally, the skill composition of the population drastically changes over time and is likely to evolve in future years. In 1995, numbers taken from Lee and Miller (1997) reveal that 64 percent of the population aged 80 had a diploma lower than high school, against 24 percent for those graduated from high school and 12 percent for those higher than high school. For the cohort aged 55, these numbers were respectively 21 percent, 38 percent and 41 percent. For the cohort aged 30 in 1995, we have 13 percent, 35 percent and 52 percent. Obviously, skill heterogeneity is very strong among living generations. According to the forecasts of Lee and Miller (1997) , these proportions are likely to change in the future, respectively converging towards 10.9 percent, 28.9 percent and 60.2 percent for future cohorts of adults with completed schooling. Such a forecast can be seen as a medium variant, lying between the "low projection" and the 5 "high projection" of Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000) .
The rise in education attainment can be explained by several factors (public education expenditures, rise in the skill premium...). For the next decades, the increase in human capital per worker seems rather ineluctable as new educated cohorts will progressively replace older less educated ones. These changes are likely to generate …scal gains for the government. We argue that education is a key parameter for evaluating the long-run sustainability of the current policy. By disregarding such changes, the generational accounting technique induces two biases:
² extrapolating the living generation's accounts on the basis of the current net tax pro…le and common growth assumptions for taxes and bene…ts, the technique is likely to lead to an underestimation of the net payments by living cohorts.
It makes little sense to assume that average net taxes of the generation aged 20 in 1995 can be projected on the basis on average net taxes paid by the current older generations. Taking account of speci…c pro…les per schooling level and changes in the skill composition of living cohorts allows to determine more accurate path of net taxes for future years. This improves the evaluation of the total burden left on future generations; ² evaluating the lifetime net tax rate of future generations must account for the real lifetime labor income of these cohorts. These amounts obviously depend on general assumption about total factor productivity but also on assumptions about the skill composition of future generations. By disregarding the skill 6 structure of future generations, the accounting technique is likely to underestimate the lifetime labor income of these cohorts.
In the rest of this paper, we show that the rise in educational attainment strongly modi…es the conclusion of GPS. To make comparisons relevant, our analysis is also based on the 1995 …scal year and our adjustment calculations rely on the counterfactual hypothesis that all changes begin in 1995. Generally speaking, our paper provides a sensitivity analysis to GPS benchmark assumptions. Our conclusions are more optimistic and raise numerous issues about educational policies and social mobility (how to increase the incentives to educate? Would the cost of increasing the average schooling level exceed the …scal gains?), about the political sustainability of current taxes and transfers (if the government de…cit decreases, will there be a …scal pressure to reduce taxes or to increase transfers) and about the structure of the labor market (can these …scal gains resist to the increasing supply of skills?). Nevertheless, the only purpose of our contribution is to compute the impact of educational changes on the government budget constraint all other things being constant, i.e. taking the economic environment as given. Consequently, our results must exclusively be appreciated in terms of …scal sustainability.
Section 2 discusses data issues and the calibration of net tax pro…les per age and education level. It is shown that educational attainment a¤ects both taxes and bene…ts. However, di¤erences in tax pro…les are stronger. Generational accounts per skill are then computed in section 3. As in GPS, our basic assumptions about the growth rates of per capita taxes and bene…ts build on the o¢cial projections of the Congressional Budget O¢ce (CBO). 3 The term "…scal policy" then re ‡ects CBO (1997a CBO ( , 1997b .
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concludes. An appendix provides our mathematical tools for generational accounting with heterogenous skills and an alternative simulation closer to the CBO aggregate projections. However, we show that the latter scenario is rather inconsistent with the assumption about labor productivity growth. We conclude that changes in educational attainment is a key parameter for analyzing the sustainability of the …scal policy.
Data issues
Estimating the age pro…les of taxes and bene…ts for a reference year is the building block for any longitudinal calculation. In this paper, we use GPS estimates of the contemporary pro…les for men and women in 1995. We aggregate men and women pro…les using sex composition data per age. These pro…les concern six types of tax All these disaggregated pro…les are then calibrated so as to be consistent with the GPS averages. We use data on the skill composition of the US living cohorts in 1995 from Lee and Miller (1997) . For the population aged 20 and more, these data correspond to the education levels measured in the US General Social Survey (GSS). The …rst column of table 1 gives the cohort shares per educational level in 1995.
It appears that 52.0 percent of the population aged 30 has a diploma higher than high school, against 35.0 percent for those graduated from high school and 13.0 percent for those lower than high school. At 60 years old, these numbers were respectively 36.6 percent, 36.9 percent and 26.5 percent. For the newborns, they should be 60.2 percent, 28.9 percent and 10.9 percent.
The rest of table 1 thus provides age pro…les per educational level fully consistent with the GPS estimates. We only report the main categories of taxes and transfers. di¤erences are also appearing in bene…t pro…les. In terms of net taxes, low skill agents are obviously the main bene…ciaries of the …scal policy whilst medium and high skill agents are the contributors. At age 60, the ratio of net taxes between a high skilled and a medium skilled is about 3.5. Hence, it makes no doubt that changes in the educational structure strongly a¤ect the sustainability of the current …scal policy. ² the net tax pro…les are assumed to be stable over time. It could be argued that the rise in educational attainment will impact on the return to skill and reduce the gap between skilled and unskilled workers even if it did not happen in the past decades (between 1970 and 2000, the return to skills has increased despite a remarkable rise in educational attainment). It could also be argued that the rise in school attendance will change the average cost of education per student.
However, endogenizing the tax pro…les is beyond the scope of our accounting study;
² the educational attainment of living generations in 1995 is depicted in table 1. For each living generation, the educational structure is assumed to be constant over time. Given the absence of life table per educational attainment, we disregard the e¤ect of heterogeneity in mortality (life expectancy is usually higher for the high skilled) as well as the timing of immigration ‡ows (for young generations, future immigration ‡ows are likely to reduce the share of skilled workers over time);
² as for the PVG, the discount rate is set to 6 percent. The growth rate of individual taxes and transfers beyond 2070 is set to 1.2 percent. generates a present value of payments lower than the total burden left by living generations. In words, the current …scal policy is still unsustainable.
Restoring the balance thus requires cutting transfers or increasing taxes. In the classical method of generational accounting, such an adjustment is implemented by multiplying net taxes of future generations by a constant adjustment factor. In our case with heterogenous agents, such a rule would give rise to inconsistent results since generational accounts are of opposite signs. For example, multiplying generational accounts by 1.1 would induce more …scal e¤ort for individuals with a positive account at birth, but a lower e¤ort for those with a negative account. Moreover, it seems quite unrealistic to adjust the accounts of future generations only. As argued by Haveman (1994), both living and future generations are likely to be concerned by …scal changes.
For these reasons, we use an adjustment method which concerns all the members of all the generations. In a …rst step, we compute the present value of payments by future generations under the current …scal policy. Comparing this amount to the residual burden given by the budget constraint, we obtain the gap to be …nanced by (in case of de…cit) or to be allocated to (in case of surplus) all living and future generations. In a second step, we compute the proportional adjustment in all taxes (or in all transfers) required to balance the budget. Finally, given the "adjusted" …scal policy, we derive the new generational accounts and lifetime net tax rate. 6 Our adjustment calculations rely on the counterfactual assumption that all changes begin in 1995. In the line of GPS, let us now consider another scenario in which public education expenditures (about one …fth of government purchases) are treated as individual transfers. In our baseline scenario, education spending are evolving at the same pace as the rest of government purchases such as defense or administration. In this new scenario (labelled as "Education Bene…t"), they evolve with the demography (the number of individual in age of schooling), the educational composition of successive cohorts (determining the length and the cost of schooling) and with common growth assumption taken from GPS study. This scenario is then extremely important for our study. Table 4 gives the generational accounts of living generations. Treating education spending as bene…ts obviously reduces newborns' accounts for each schooling level. The di¤erences with the baseline scenario amounts to $43,000 for the low skilled, $42,300 for the medium skilled and $59,000 for the high skilled. These numbers measure the cost of education (in present value at birth). The changes are important for individual aged 25 and less. They are minor for older generations for which mandatory education belongs to the past. As it will appear on table 5, lifetime net tax rates of newborns become -68.2 percent, 2.5 percent and 13.3 percent.
Once again, our average generational accounts per cohort are not identical to GPS amounts. This clearly appears on …g. 3. The di¤erences are small for old-age cohorts but they are larger for young cohorts. Extrapolating the future taxes and transfers of newborns on the basis of the contemporary pro…le, the classical method underevaluates the newborns' average account by about 35 percent. As in GPS, our baseline scenario assumes a 6 percent discount rate and that productivity increases by 1.2 percent a year. This discount rate is roughly equal to the historical real rate of return on equity. A 1.2 percent productivity growth rate is a reasonable value given the past trend of labor productivity. Table 6 reports alternative projections when the interest rate amounts to 3 percent (a value closer to the real return on government bonds) or 9 percent (a value closer to the return on private capital) and when the labor productivity growth rate varies between 0.7 percent and 1.7 percent a year. These alternative scenarios are the same as those used in GPS analysis. The results must be compared to the baseline scenario in which education spending are included in government purchases.
Obviously, alternative assumptions about the rate of productivity growth have a minor e¤ect on the results. Remember that the pure indexation of individual taxes and bene…ts on productivity growth is implemented after the year 2070. Before that date, the evolution of taxes and bene…ts relies on the CBO forecasts and is not much a¤ected by the growth hypothesis. On the contrary, alternative assumptions about the interest rate modify the calculations. The lifetime net tax rate of low skill individuals is particularly a¤ected when the interest rate changes. However, interest rates and growth rates do not modify the main result: in all cases, the current …scal policy is unsustainable. The policy adjustments to restore the generational balance are robust (especially when the interest rate increases). The tax variation ranges from 28 1.0 to 4.7 percent in the two extreme scenarios. Transfer cuts range from 2.5 to 9.0 percent. Finally, let us examine the sensitivity of our results to the assumptions about educational attainment of young and future generations. Our baseline scenario is based on Lee and Miller (1997) . For the population aged 0 to 19 (those reaching age 20 between 1996 and 2015), Lee and Miller (1997) (2000), the baseline scenario must be considered as a reasonable medium variant.
Two alternative forecasts can be simulated. Building on the "high projection"
of Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000) , the high variant is based on very optimistic assumptions about future educational attainment. In the long-run, it assumes that the proportions of high skilled workers aged 30 will reach 70.2 percent in 2030 (against 5.2 percent for low skilled workers and 24.6 for the medium skilled). Our "low variant"
relies on the most pessimistic annual forecast from Lee and Miller. We keep the 2005 educational structure (16 percent for the low skilled, 32 and 52 percent for the medium and high skilled) as constant after that year. discounted cost of such a policy could exceed the discounted …scal gains. In some sense, the baseline scenario seems more realistic since it relies on the current State intervention. Nevertheless, our sensitivity analysis demonstrates the crucial role of education policies in the debate on aging and public …nance. 
Conclusion
It is usually argued that expected demographic changes threaten the sustainability of …scal policies. In most industrialized countries, social policies involve considerable transfers from young cohorts to old cohorts. If the number of bene…ciaries increases, the …nancial viability of the system is obviously questioned. Generational accounting is perceived as a meaningful way to evaluate the sustainability of …scal policy. Updated calculations made for the US reveal a large generational imbalance which can be restored by increasing taxes or cutting transfers.
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To the best of our knowledge, these studies do not take account of a remarkable change in the characteristics of people, the rise in educational attainment. This change is budgetary important since it strongly modi…es the …scal means and needs of successive generations. In this paper, we disaggregate tax and bene…t age-pro…les per schooling level. This reveals strong di¤erences in net taxes among living generations.
Aggregating these net taxes on a whole lifetime basis, we show that the low skill newborns' account is negative (-15 . 4 Our results are more optimistic than those of existing studies. Our baseline scenario indicates that the current …scal policy (de…ned by the current level of taxes and transfers as well as by the growth assumptions of per capita taxes and bene…ts provided by the CBO) generates a long-run de…cit. However, the de…cit is much lower than the GPS predictions. Restoring the generational balance requires cutting transfers by 2.7 percent or increasing taxes taxes by 1.2 percent. These results are quite robust to our assumptions about labor productivity growth, interest rate.
Treating education expenditures as transfers gives similar results. However, results are sensitive to assumptions about the educational structure of future cohorts.
Is that a su¢cient reason to move from a highly pessimistic position to a highly optimistic one? This strongly depends on the (at least relative) stability of net tax pro…les per schooling level. We should keep in mind that generational accounting is a pure mechanical projection tool which keeps these relative di¤erences as constant over time. It does not take account of the interdependencies between the demography, the changes in the educational structure and the economy. If young generations are more and more educated, the average cost of education per student could be a¤ected. If 
Methodology with heterogenous agents
The starting point of the generational accounting technique is the government's intertemporal budget constraint. At the base year t, the sum of the public net wealth and the present value of prospective aggregate net payments by living and future generations must equalize the present value of prospective public purchases:
where P V L t measures the present value of net tax payments by living generations over the rest of their life, P V F t is the present value of net tax payments by future generations, P V G t stands for the present value of prospective government purchases of goods and services and NW t is the net public wealth.
The net wealth at time t is observed. Two of the remaining terms are projected using contemporaneous observations and o¢cial projections, P V G t and P V L t . The fourth term, P V F t , can thus be calculated as the residual burden bequeathed to future generations.
The present value of government purchases is the discounted sum of public expenditures:
where G s is the amount of public purchases projected at time s¸t; i denotes the interest rate. In practice, the path of G s can be partly projected on the basis of budgetary forecasts (i.e. between t and t ¤ ) and partly projected using balanced growth assumptions (between t ¤ and 1). In the long-run, it is assumed that G s grows at the same rate as the growth rate of the total factor productivity, g.
The present value of net tax payments by living generations can be obtained by summing the present value of net taxes these generations will pay to the government over the rest of their life, i.e. summing the generational accounts of living cohorts.
We distinguish three educational levels (L = low level, M = mean level and H = high level) and suppose that each individual can live a maximum of D years. The present value of payments by living generations, P V L t , can be written as Is this scenario based on CBO aggregated projections more consistent than our baseline scenario? Our answer depends on the growth rates of per capita taxes and bene…ts. Table A .2 compares the average growth rates per item for the period 2010-2050. Our calculations indicate that the baseline growth rates are more consistent with the 1.2 percent growth rate of labor productivity. This is especially the case for individual taxes. In our baseline scenario, the growth rate of labor income tax, capital 41 income tax and FICA are fully consistent with the growth rate of labor productivity.
In the other scenario, this is obviously not the case. The gap between labor productivity growth and the growth rates of per capita bene…t is also smaller in our baseline scenario. 
